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Abstract

The concept of possession in law has been a complicated one for hundreds
of years, and many civil codes are complex in their own idiosyncratic ways.
(Draft) Common Framework of Reference is no exception, and it even contains
arguably one of the most complicated possession stipulations ever. This article
first summarizes the gist of each chapter in a new book the author edited, Law
and Economics of Possession. Then, this article applies the economy of concept
theory developed by Henry Smith to the concept of possession and critiques the
DCFR for manipulating the notion of physical control. To demonstrate the
downside of cerebral concept, this article provides several examples where the
DCFR contradicts itself. As an alternative, this article contends that possession
defined as physical control and without any exception is both simple and useful.
No doctrine needs to be changed substantively. The doctrines are only
constructed more clearly. In addition, the DCFR raises the question of whether
possession is a fact or a right, but fails to provide a sound explanation. This
article argues that possession is both a fact and a subsidiary right, depending on
which dimension of possession is discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION

My edited book, Law and Economics of Possession, was published by
Cambridge University Press in May 2015. 1 Contributors to this volume include
Benito Arruñada, Abraham Bell, Richard Epstein, Daniel B. Kelly, Daniel Klerman,
James Krier, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Thomas Merrill, Shitong Qiao, Carol Rose,
Christopher Serkin, Henry Smith, and myself. Each book chapter employs lawand-economics to analyze general or concrete possession issues in property law.
To give readers of this journal a quick overview of the book, at the suggestion of
Editor-in-Chief Prof. Sjef van Erp, I summarize the gist of each chapter in Part II
of this article. To show the policy implication of property law and economics
theory for European private law, Part III applies the “economy of concept theory"
relied on in my book chapter to critique the possession-related stipulations in
Draft Common Frame of Reference (the DCFR).

Economic analysis of law, the research approach used in the aforementioned
edited volume, has been the dominant methodology used in the past half-century
in the U.S. The success of law and economics in the U.S. can partly be attributed to
the federal system, where each state has its own common law and state
regulations. Diversity is the best soil for law and economics. When there is only
one court, one code, or one set of rules, jurists would be prone to take the
existing doctrines as granted, and black-letter law studies would have the upper
hand. Nevertheless, when jurisdictions in an internal market compete with each
other, or when scholars compare the same doctrine across near-by jurisdictions,
differences loom large. A natural question arises: which variant of the doctrine is
the best? Against this backdrop, economic analysis of law offers economics
efficiency as the measuring stick of desirability, and this approach has led to
fruitful results. 2
Law and economics has been thriving in Europe in the past several decades

1

Y-c Chang (ed), Law and Economics of Possession (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015).
For comparative law and economics researches, see, e.g., Y-c Chang, 'Property Law with Chinese
Characteristics: An Economic and Comparative Analysis' (2012) 1 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights
Conference Journal 345; Y-c Chang, 'Access to Landlocked Land: A Case for a Hybrid of Property and
Liability Rules' (2013) working paper ; Y-c Chang, 'An Economic and Comparative Analysis of
Specificatio (the Accession Doctrine)' (2014) 39 European Journal of Law and Economics 225; Y-c
Chang and LA Fennell, 'Partition and Revelation' (2014) 81 The University of Chicago Law Review
27; U Mattei, Basic Principles of Property Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Introduction
(Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn. 2000); H Hansmann and U Mattei, 'The Function of Trust Law: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis' (1998) 73 New York University Law Review 434.
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as well. 3 The European Association of Law and Economics is almost as old as I
am, and the 32nd annual conference is held in 2015. Doctrinal study of law
(Rechtsdogmatik) has been, and still is, the mainstream in Europe, as most legal
scholars traditionally focus on the domestic laws in one EU member state. Like
the U.S., Europe contains dozens of jurisdictions and in many ways the
differences in legal systems across jurisdictions are greater in Europe. With the
progress of harmonization of law in Europe and projects like the DCFR, it should
not be surprising that legal scholars nowadays are searching for analytical tools
that could help answer the question of which variant of a doctrine is better to
serve as the model for the whole of Europe. 4 Economic analysis of law is not the
only approach that could supply a plausible answer, but the policy
recommendation is often fresh, interesting, and illuminating—at least from my
biased point of view. In searching for a common framework toward European
private law, economic analysis of law will, I hope, prove instrumental in
evaluating the pros and cons of property regimes in various European countries,
and contribute to pinpointing the most desirable property doctrines for Europe.

To concretely demonstrate the insights of law and economics, in Part III, I
critically examine the possession-related rules in the DCFR. Arthur Salomons has
pointed out two prototypical approaches in drafting the CFR: the best-solution
approach and the common-core approach. 5 Salomons also observed that as time
goes by, the drafters of Volume VIII of the DCFR drifted away from the commoncore approach. Economic analysis of law is best characterized as a best-solution
approach. My argument that possession should be defined as simply physical
control without any exception exemplifies such an approach. To my knowledge,
no European jurisdiction has adopted such a revolutionarily simple idea, thus my
design is neither common nor core, but I shall argue that it is the best solution.

3

Compare Arthur Salomons, who has lamented that law and economics has “hardly made any
headway in Europe.” AF Salomons, 'On the Economics of Good Faith Acquisition Protection in the
DCFR' in A Somma (ed) The Politics of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (Wolters Kluwer, New
York, NY 2009) 207.
4
For the concept of possession in the first legal model for Europe (that is, the Roman law), see RA
Epstein, 'Possession and Licenses: the FCC, Weak Spectrum Rights, and the LightSquared Debacle' in
Y-c Chang (ed) Law and Economics of Possession (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015)
237–46; E Descheemaeker, 'The Consequences of Possession' in E Descheemaeker (ed) The
Consequences of Possession (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2014) 9–11.
5
AF Salomons, 'The Purpose and Coherence of the Rules on Good Faith Acquisition and Acquisitive
Prescription in the Draft Common Frame of Reference: A Tale of Two Gatekeepers' (2013) 21
European Review of Private Law 843, 861.
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II. LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION IN A NUTSHELL

Law and Economics of Possession begins with Thomas Merrill’s
“Ownership and Possession.” Merrill analyzes the concepts and relations of
possession and ownership from the perspective of information costs. Possession
imposes low information costs in the world of strangers, whereas ownership,
which is harder to prove, requires more information costs in order to conduct
impersonal exchange. In the modern world where recording or registration of
titles is cheaply available, the reason to continue protecting possession
independently of ownership, is that possession can be determined by observing
the relationship between natural persons and tangible objects in a physical
world—usually simple and easy. This allows ordinary people to conduct their
daily business without expending high information costs. Protecting possession
legally can also empower social norm to sanction possession violators and
relieve people’s burdens of resorting to recording of titles from time to time or to
keeping documentary proofs of ownership such as receipts for long periods of
time.
Carol Rose, in Chapter 2, analyzes the proverb “possession is nine-tenths
of the law,” inquiring what the other point of the law is (one regular candidate
being provenance) and whether this proverb is an accurate description of the
world. Rose argues that possession is not just about physical control, or the right
to exclude, but about acting like an owner. Generally, using makes one act like an
owner. She finds support for such a claim from the case law of first possession
and adverse possession. Rose also emphasizes the importance of community
support and recognition of possession. Her takeaway point is that when the law
is weak, possession is nine-tenths of the law. By contrast, when the law is settled,
the law is nine-tenths of possession.
Henry Smith offers a modular theory of possession. Smith emphasizes
salience in identifying and delineating possession. For Smith, along the same
lines with longtime coauthor Merrill, possession is very much based on social
norms and is the default in property law because it is low-cost and intuitive for
the public. More formalized legal tools, such as ownership, will be used only
when stakes become high. Note that possession itself is a formalized version of
the possessory custom, the ultimate default regime for assigning things to
persons. Possession thus exhibits what Smith calls the “elsewhere pattern,”
meaning that “possession is defined by not being anything else.” More
specifically, possession is the most basic rule in many scenarios, and possession
applies when nothing else does. Smith also observes that although civil law
3
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treats property as the law of things, common law eschews this notion. However,
the function that the concept of things served in civil law is captured by the
concept of possession in the common law. Possession (with close ties to customs
and informal norms) and accession work in tandem to determine what a thing is
(and, relatedly, what are only elements of a thing but not a thing itself). Thinghood, or the demarcation of things, very much depends on general, everyday
ontology, echoing Merrill’s point.

My own chapter, “The Economy of Concept and Possession,” draws on
Henry Smith’s economy of concept theory 6 and argues that a simpler concept of
possession (with actual/physical control as the necessary and sufficient
condition) economizes on information costs and makes the possession law much
more comprehensible. The confusion in the civil codes and the scholarly
literature arises from conflation of three different concepts: possession as a fact;
possession as a subsidiary right that is one stick in the ownership bundle; and
possession as a basis for acquiring and relinquishing titles, as in adverse
possession, first possession, and abandonment. Actual/physical control is the
least common denominator in all possession-related issues; thus, possession qua
actual/physical control is a fact. The subsidiary possessory right is implied in the
property structure, but it is never spelled out. It can be transferred from owners
to, for example, holders of usufruct. Finally, intents only matter when possessors
gain or lose titles, and the required intents differ across contexts; thus, a specific
intent should not be embedded in the baseline definition of possession, but left
to specific doctrines. As elaborated below, the baseline definition of possession is
useful in many parts of a civil code, such as self-help, revindication, and goodfaith purchase. As the DCFR fails to stick to the baseline definition of possession,
it has to be further complicated the relevant doctrines to restore order—which
could have been easily achieved by the simple definition of possession as
physical control.
Lewinsohn-Zamir, in Chapter 5, draws on the findings of behavioral-lawand-economists. She takes these researchers to task for failing to distinguish
possession from ownership (not to mention lawful from unlawful possession),
6

HE Smith, 'On the Economy of Concepts in Property' (2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 2097. In short, a shorter description of a fact or a concept with the same generality better
economizes on information costs. For most people, 2015 A.D., as compared to 2566 years since
Confucius was born, better economizes information costs, even though both refer to the same year. A
more economic conceptual system helps to reduce errors in the legal systems, as it is easier to
understand and implement. As evidenced below, the drafters of the DCFR chose a fairly complex
conceptual system of possession, and as a result made many conflicting statements. If drafters fail to
firmly grasp their own conceptual system, later users are hopeless.
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but notes that the few studies that attend to the difference suggest that
possession itself looms large in creating the “endowment effect.”

Like Lewinsohn-Zamir, in Chapter 6, James Krier and Christopher Serkin
draw on the psychological literature, most notably the System 1 versus System 2
theory popularized by Daniel Kahnemann. Krier and Serkin point out that the
scholarship of Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith focuses on information costs and
the right to exclude; thus, their views can be characterized as emphasizing the
quick but error-prone role of System 1. Other scholars, by contrast, stress the
importance of making complex arrangements in property law to promote
normative goals, such as human flourishing. It takes the sharp yet energyconsuming System 2 to perform this trick. As their chapter title suggests, Krier
and Serkin focus on possession as heuristics, echoing Merrill, in Chapter 1. They
powerfully apply their possession heuristics thesis to criticize theoretical
literature and court decisions in the realm of relativity of title, first possession
(capture) of wild and domesticated animals and natural resources, finders of lost
versus mislaid movables, shared possession in concurrent ownership, and
adverse possession.
Daniel Kelly, in Chapter 7, critically reviews the scant literature on
whether an owner’s private incentive to divide possessory rights will exceed the
socially optimal level. Kelly contends that most costs and benefits of such
division are internalized, and thus fragmentation is unlikely, particularly for
tangible objects. Kelly also draws on the psychology literature, observing that
individuals are inclined to hold full rights (rather than partial rights) in a
resource. Contributing to the debate on the efficiency of the numerus clausus
principle, Kelly points out that property forms, as compared to contracts, better
deter strategic behaviors, implying that in areas where owners’ incentives to
divide possessory rights are suboptimal. Adding new property forms could
improve efficiency, as new property forms facilitate division.
Focusing on information costs, Benito Arruñada, in Chapter 8, examines
how possession gives notice to facilitate impersonal exchange. Drawing
examples from the Roman law and medieval English law to modern German and
US law, Arruñada demonstrates that “exercise” of possession is effective as a
titling mechanism when it is observable by third parties and “delivery” of
possession (for example, livery of seisin) is public knowledge. In addition, as
possession is only effective to inform one single in rem right, relying on
possession for titling requires that all other rights be either reduced to in
personam status or be burdened by the possessory in rem right. Arruñada also
5
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analyzes documentary possession (such as possession of negotiable
instruments), and argues that documentary possession is effective as a titling
mechanism only in the absence of multiple in rem rights.

Richard Epstein, in Chapter 9, focuses on spectrum rights, particularly the
so-called “LightSquared Debacle.” He begins with a restatement of possession
versus ownership law in Roman and English law, tracing the concept of
possession. After a detailed description of the LightSquared controversy, Epstein
points out that the weak property rights given to spectrum licensees are due to
the FCC’s ill-advised regulatory policy. He argues that the same system of
possession and property rights used in the common law is also applicable to
spectrum, which more resembles trade names and trademarks than copyrights
and patents. The nuisance law, in particular, can be carried over to protect
holders of broadband interests.

Daniel Klerman, in Chapter 10, analyzes choice of law and jurisdiction
issues in property, with appropriation of water, adverse possession of stolen
arts, and first possession of wild animals as the prominent examples. Klerman
argues that the situs rule is mostly correct in terms of giving individuals,
legislators, and judges the right incentives to behave efficiently (such as making
efficient laws or making best use of the land and attendant water). In the context
of adverse possession of stolen arts, however, a choice of law rule that applies
the law of the last place of undisputed ownership gives the relevant parties the
best incentives. Regarding jurisdictional issues, although Klerman points out that
there is no clear-cut best rule in stolen arts issues, he contends that the courts of
the place where the art was last undisputedly owned are good candidates.
Shitong Qiao, in Chapter 11, focuses on a unique adverse possession
problem: “small property” in Shenzhen, the fourth largest city in China. In China,
rural land is collectively owned, whereas urban land is state-owned. Only urban
land can be commercially developed, and the only way to convert rural land to
urban land is through eminent domain. The economic development in Shenzhen
in the past few decades was faster than the pace of providing enough affordable
housing by the government. As a result, farmers/villagers in Shenzhen started to
build illegal houses and condominiums despite the legal ban. That is, they
adversely possessed and developed public land. Without an adverse possession
law, developers could not acquire formal title to the buildings and only had
“small property” rights. With first-hand materials from his yearlong fieldwork in
Shenzhen, Qiao argues that a call-option liability rule is the most efficient in
6
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dealing with the small-property conundrum because of information asymmetry
between the government and the numerous holders of small-property rights.

In the final chapter, Abraham Bell leads us to one of the most famous
possession doctrines, the first possession rule, and reexamines the normative
impulse for property law’s use of possession as a key to acquiring greater
property rights. Bell challenges Richard Epstein’s classic view in his seminal
article, “Possession as the Root of Title.” 7 Epstein posits that first possession is
an essential rule in property law primarily because it long has been used, and it
provides for rapid dissemination of private property rights. Bell argues that in
some cases, property law recognizes first possession as a source of title for an
entirely different reason: it is essential to recognize rights de jure that already
exist de facto, lest the legal system of property lose its salience. Put differently, if
the law did not recognize legal rights as a result of possession, many first
possessors would find it advantageous to eschew legal rights and protect their
possessory rights extra-legally. Indeed, in cases where the law denies property
rights notwithstanding possession, robust extra-legal asset markets have
developed, undermining the goals that led lawmakers to split property rights
from possession. Examples of this phenomenon can be found, for instance, in the
markets for illegal antiquities and natural resources. However, first possession is
often a problematic way to allocate titles; salvage rules can often provide an
alternative that both rewards de facto possession and reduces wasteful
overexploitation.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE POSSESSION CONCEPT IN THE DCFR

In my book chapter on economizing the concept of possession, I draw
examples from national laws in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Japan, China,
and Taiwan. This part applies my theory to examine the possession stipulations
in Book VIII of the DCFR. My conclusion is that, the DCFR, like the national laws I
examined in my book chapter, unfortunately adopts an overly complex concept
of possession. Complexity leads to confusion and contradiction. 8
My proposal is modest: define possession as actual/physical control—no

7

RA Epstein, 'Possession as the Root of Title' (1979) 13 Georgia Law Review 1221.
Henry Smith would point out that when possession becomes unintuitive for the public, it hampers
possession’s default function in property law. HE Smith, 'The Elements of Possession' in Y-c Chang
(ed) Law and Economics of Possession (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015).
7
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more; no less. 9 The underlying rationale, elaborated in my chapter, 10 is that
possession, a basic element in private law, is drawn upon in many parts of Book
VIII (Comment A to VIII-1:205) 11 and other private-law doctrines. Nevertheless,
possession is just one concept and it can be combined with other concepts in
various doctrines. 12 Thus, the concept “possession” need not contain too many
elements. Put differently, possession as the least common denominator is the
simplest way to coordinate various possession-related doctrines in private law.
Moreover, the party who has physical control is often the least cost avoider in
many legal issues. Thus, it is substantively efficient to impose liability on, and
award benefits to, the party with physical control. 13 It is conceptually efficient to
call such parties simply possessors rather than a complicated set of rules or
terms to describe such parties.
A recent article by Thomas Merrill, Possession as a Natural Right, 14 bolsters
my argument from another angle. Merrill, using examples from traditional and
digital IP rights and real property rights, contends that “property systems draw
heavily upon, and derive much of their legitimacy and efficacy from, mimicking
or synchronizing with possession.” 15 Possession, for Merrill, has a biological
foundation and thus people in all human society have what he calls “possession
instinct.” 16 Possession, as Merrill depicts, can be effortlessly understood by
ordinary people in daily context. While Merrill does not provide an intensive
definition of possession (he does point out that possession is grounded in
exclusion 17), the possession concept that could work in his theory must be a
simple and intuitive one. There could be a few ways of defining possession along
this line, and suffice for me to point out here that my definition of possession as
physical control is one of those fitting definitions. People embedded in their own
9

Cf. CM Rose, 'The Law Is Nine-tenths of Possession: An Adage Turned on Its Head' in Y-c Chang
(ed) Law and Economics of Possession (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015)(possession is
more about acting like an owner); D Lewinsohn-Zamir, 'What Behavioral Studies Can Teach Jurists
about Possession and Vice Versa' in Y-c Chang (ed) Law and Economics of Possession (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 2015)(expanding the extension of possession).
10
Y-c Chang, 'The Economy of Concept and Possession' in Y-c Chang (ed) Law and Economics of
Possession (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015) 117–124.
11
Study Group on a European Civil Code & Research Group on the Existing EC Private law (Acquis
Group), Draft Common Frame of Reference (the DCFR). Full Edition: Principles, Definitions and
Model Rules on European Private Law Reference (1st edition, Seller European Law Publishers 2009)
4291.
12
Chang (n 10) 121.
13
Ibid 123–24.
14
TW Merrill, 'Possession as a Natural Right' (2015) 9 New York University Journal of Law & Liberty
345.
15
Ibid 356.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid 371.
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social norm understand physical control in its non-technical sense.

Before I elaborate on my arguments, let me be clear that I do not mean to
disparage the commendable drafters of the DCFR. The possession concept in the
DCFR is largely based on the German BGB paradigm, and even if drafters of the
DCFR had chosen the French CC paradigm that distinguishes between detention
and possession, it is not necessarily an improvement in conceptual clarity. Most
codified private laws in Europe (and East Asia) have been trapped in the
traditional conceptual system. The DCFR is no exception. My goal is to advocate a
clearer possession concept with a slim hope to influence the final political CFR
and/or European Civil Code. Below I demonstrate how an overly complicated
conceptual system could contradict itself and creates problem for understanding.
Section A questions the exact meaning of physical control and points out
that its definition changes throughout Volume VIII. Section B provides several
concrete examples of how the possession concept creates confusion. Section C
advocates an alternative way to conceptualize possession. Section D contends
that possession is both a fact and a subsidiary right, and distinguishes in rem and
in personam right to possess in the DCFR.
A. The Mysterious Physical Control

the DCFR VIII-1:205(1) defines possession as “having direct physical control
or indirect physical control over the goods.” The meaning of physical control,
however, is nowhere to be found in the articles and comments of the DCFR.
Indeed, this ambiguity proves to be critical, as it leaves room for the DCFR to
manipulate the concept of possession.
The DCFR sets the stage of confusion by coining various new terms, such as
owner-possessor (OP), limited-right-possessor (LRP), and possessor-agent (PA).
It seems to me, an Asian civil property law scholar, that this is a wild term parade
without a clue of what the celebration is for. The DCFR Comments do not
elaborate why these new concepts are necessary and do not persuasively explain
their conceptual or functional advantage over alternative possession concepts.
Before elaborating on my proposal, I demonstrate the conceptual problem in the
DCFR.

VIII-1:205 equates possession as “having direct physical control or indirect
physical control over the goods” without requiring possessors to have any
intention to possess (animus). Hence, it appears that possessors are whoever has
9
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physical control. 18 VIII-1:206 defines that OPs shall have the intention of
controlling as, or as if, an owner. According to VIII-1:207, LRPs must have one of
two required intentions. At this point, the conceptual system is clear: possessors
with certain intentions would be labeled as OPs or LRPs, whereas possessors
without those intentions would be bare-bone possessors. Finally, VIII-1:208
defines possessor-agents (PA) as exercising possession without the
aforementioned intentions. Now it starts to be confusing for a novice: Isn’t PA
then synonymous with possessors? Or are PAs one type of possessors? Worse
yet, the DCFR Comment makes it clear that PAs are not possessors. The concepts
do not add up for readers of the outline edition of the DCFR. One has to immerse
oneself in the thousands of pages of the DCFR Comments and Notes in the full
edition of the DCFR and parses through the text to start to have a better idea.
The devil is in the details. As emphasized in Comment D to VIII-1:205, 19 a
verb makes all the difference. PAs are not possessors because they merely
exercise physical control but do not have physical control. VIII-1:205(1) has
carefully defined possession as having physical control, while VIII-1:205(2)–(3)
and the following three articles choose exercising physical control as the critical
element. But, apart from the slight semantic difference, what is the real
difference? the DCFR does not address this issue.

To find out the answer, we have to return to the initial question of what
physical control is, which is a difficult one. Leave aside what “having physical
control” means for a moment, and focus on exercising physical control. VIII1:205(2) characterizes a person who exercises physical control personally as a
direct possessor. This is easy to understand. One may quarrel over the nuance
differences between any proposed definitions for exercising physical control in
this scenario and may debate in marginal cases whether the person in question
exercises physical control. But most pragmatic jurists should be able to reach a
consensus in most cases. For instance, I locked my car and have the key in my
backpack. I thus physically control the car and the key in person. 20 But then VIII1:205(2) and VIII-1:207 allow me to use PAs to exercise my control. For example,
I drive to a fancy new restaurant and hand my car key over to a valet who I have
18

Akkermans also questions why the DCFR does not include intention in the definition of possession.
B Akkermans, 'The role of the (D) CFR in the making of European property law' in V Sagaert, M
Storme and E Terryn (eds), The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR): A National and
Comparative Perspective (Intersentia, Cambridge 2012) 281.
19
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 4295.
20
Some would question that since I am away from the car, how can I in the literal sense physically
control the car? In my chapter, I solve this question by delineating someone’s possession as continuous
until someone else has taken up stronger physical control. Chang (n 10) 117.
10
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never met. Now, at my dining table, I have no idea where the valet, my key, and
my car are. But I can rest assured that the DCFR recognizes me as a direct
possessor because I have physical control. But isn’t the definition of (exercising)
direct physical control just expanded to possession through an agent?

Moreover, VIII-1:205(3) makes things more complicated by explicitly
allowing physical control to be indirect. I actually rented the car from Avis a few
days ago at a 300-mile-away airport. I am relieved to know that the DCFR dubs
me as a direct possessor, but I am also amused to know that Avis the mother
company or the airport branch is considered an indirect possessor of the car. I do
plan to return the car, but how in the world does Avis physically control the car,
in the literal sense of the term, albeit only indirectly? 21 Under ordinary English
grammar, indirect physical control is still physical control, so the intension and
extension of physical control have to be wide enough to encompass both indirect
and direct physical control. That will have to be very wide. Also, what does the
word physical mean? My Oxford English dictionary gives several explanations,
the most relevant of which are “connected with a person’s body rather than their
mind” and “connected with things that actually exist or are present and can be
seen, felt, etc. rather than things that only exist in a person’s mind.” To me, in
many instances, indirect physical control and direct physical control through an
agent are anything but physical. Indirect physical control is an oxymoron. 22
All in all, the meaning of physical control varies depending on whether the
possession is in the hand of an indirect possessor, a direct possessor personally
exercising physical control, and a direct possessor who employs an agent. In the
next section, I provide more examples of the deficiency of the DCFR.
B. Concrete Examples where the DCFR Is Confusing

While lawyers might be proud of their prowess with jargon and their
capabilities of navigating conceptual mazes, an overly complex conceptual
system would confuse even the drafters of the DCFR, leading to contradictory
stipulations and statements. 23 Here are a few examples:
21

Some would contend that Avis is still the possessor because I the tenant merely hold detention. My
response is that the very distinction of possession and detention marks the beginning of complicating
the concept of possession. We need to step back to reconsider why the concept of detention is needed in
the first place. Under my theory, there is no need to make such a distinction. The concept of detention
is dispensable.
22
For my critique of indirect possession as possession, see Chang (n 10) 118–120.
23
As Krier and Serkin note, it takes our System 2 to design a complicated legal mechanism. JE Krier
and C Serkin, 'The Possession Heuristic' in Y-c Chang (ed) Law and Economics of Possession
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First, is a PA a possessor or not? 24 As said above, the DCFR Comment
explicitly states that “the movable is not in the possession of the PA in the legal
sense,” 25 and the DCFR Comment states that “the PA will have direct physical
control of the movable (which is actually considered as the OP’s or LRP’s direct
possession)” 26 But this “consideration” 27 or “attribut[ion]” 28 is nowhere to be
found in the articles themselves. Readers of the DCFR Outline would reason that
VIII-1:208(1)(a) defines a PA as exercising direct physical control and VIII1:205(2) recognizes a person who exercise direct physical control personally as a
direct possessor—PAs, therefore, shall be possessors. Granted, PAs lack intention
to possess, but according to the articles themselves, lack of intention only
deprives a PA of OP or LRP status, but not possessor status. Readers of the DCFR
Outline could correctly understand the original intents of the DCFR drafters only
if they suspect that “having” and “exercising” physical control have very different
meanings. Indeed, the DCFR Comment, due to perhaps an oversight, recognizes
that “PA is in possession of the movables,” 29 and the DCFR Comment admits that
“the actual physical control is with [PA].” 30 In short, if the DCFR is a civil code
and only articles themselves have legal forces, a PA is a possessor. The opposite
conclusion would require revision of the articles.

Second, not recognizing PAs as possessors impose adverse effects on other
doctrines. Regarding self-help, the DCFR intends to enable PAs to exert self-help,
but has stated in Comments that PAs are not possessors. To make it work, VIII6:202 allows “a third person” to exert “self-help.” It is again perplexing, at least
from a linguistic standpoint. If self means the first person, why can a third person
resort to it as well? This design is mainly to award PA the power of self-help,
because it is “an efficient means to protect the legitimate interests….” 31 Again we
see why PA should be considered a full-blown possessor to begin with. Also
confusingly, the DCFR Comment C mentions in passing that “third parties [other
than PAs] wishing to help someone defend property or possession” can also exert
self-help. 32 This deserves more explanations.
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015). Our System 2 is, however, limited, so drafters are
prone to make errors when their brains are overloaded by the complexity. For System 1 vs. System in
general, see D Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, NY 2011).
24
For my critique of PAs (agents in possession) as non-possessors, see Chang (n 10) 120–123.
25
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 4295.
26
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 4371.
27
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 4371.
28
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 4295.
29
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 5222.
30
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 4295.
31
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 5222.
32
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 5218.
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Moreover, self-help is a physical, perhaps brutal, act that uses force to take
back the goods in question. If so, why would VIII-6:202(3) need to allow self-help
against indirect OP who by definition does not have the thing in hand? Here, we
see that the indirect possessor should not always, if ever, be considered as
possessors.
Third, the possession concept is again challenged in the stipulations of rei
vindicatio. Pursuant to VIII-6:101(1), “[t]he owner is entitled to obtain or recover
possession of the goods from any person exercising physical control over these
goods…” The DCFR senses the need to allow owners to sue any person who
exercises physical control, no matter if she is a PA or a direct possessor. Yet again,
if possession is defined as physical control, VIII-6:101 could simply stipulate that
the owner can sue the unentitled possessor. Interestingly, Comment I
accompanying VIII-6:101notes that “[i]nstead of the words ‘physical control’ the
word ‘possession’ could be used….The words are synonymous in this context.” 33
This implies that for the purpose of revindication, a PA is a possessor. My theory
is only a step further—a PA is always a possessor.

Fourth, LRP is defined in an under-inclusive fashion. Under VIII-1:207(1)(b),
a LRP has to follow the order of OP but can retain the goods until the OP pays the
bill. If secretary S takes his boss B’s dress to a dry cleaner and leave S’s name as
the contact person for convenience’s sake, under the definition here, the dry
cleaner is not a LRP because S is not an OP. In this bailment contract, whether S is
an OP or not should not matter. But over-using the concept of OP shrinks the
domain of LRP. In addition, according to VIII-1:207(2), a LRP can have indirect
physical control over the goods. Thus, if Y rents a car from Z and X borrows or
rents the car from Y, Y is still a LRP, but what is the status of X? Z is OP and Y is
LRP, but X does not have any “specific contractual relationship” with Z, so X is not
a LRP. Nonetheless, there seems to be no reason to exclude X from the rank of
LRP.
C. My Solution: Possession as Physical Control (Period)

My solution to this conceptual labyrinth is to simplify the concept of
possession to physical/actual control and to end the use of cerebral concepts. 34

the DCFR Full Edition 2009 5170.
Chang (n 10) 123–124. Compare S Douglas, 'Is Possession Factual or Legal?' in E Descheemaeker
(ed) The Consequences of Possession (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2014) 76 (calling
possession a technical term, and its legal meaning can both narrow and expand the meaning of
possession as physical control).
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As argued above, the word “physical” in the definition of possession causes
interpretive problems. But we cannot simply remove this word, as using control
alone to explain possession is not very helpful, either. My strenuous efforts in
making sense of and understanding the possession concept in the DCFR run into
a dead-end. The only feasible way is to discard the thousand-year-old practice of
complicating possession. Brevity is the soul of wit. I give the examples of selfhelp and revindication above to show that possession as simply physical control
is clear and simple. My critics may want to challenge me to solve legal issues
where certain intentions to possess are necessary, to which I turn.

First, acquisition of ownership by continuous possession need not be
changed substantively. 35 VIII-4:101 and following articles recognize an OP’s
acquisition of ownership by continuous possession. 36 It is widely agreed that the
possessor shall have an intention to become an owner. 37 Following my
possession concept, VIII-4:101 will be essentially the same. The relevant article
shall stipulate that the possessor, in addition to her physical control, has to
possess with the belief of being the owner (good faith) or with the intention of
becoming the owner (bad faith). In my book chapter, I discuss acquisition of
ownership by continuous possession, first possession, 38 etc. under the rubric of
35
For economic analysis of continuous possession (called “adverse possession” in the U.S.), see, for
example, D Klerman, 'Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Property' in Y-c Chang (ed) Law and
Economics of Possession (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015); S Qiao, 'Small Property,
Adverse Possession, and Optional Law' in Y-c Chang (ed) Law and Economics of Possession
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015); RC Ellickson, 'Adverse Possession and Perpetuities
Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights' (1986) 64 Washington University Law
Quarterly 723; JM Netter, PL Hersch and WD Manson, 'An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession
Statutes' (1986) 6 International Review of Law and Economics 217; M Baker and others, 'Property
Rights by Squatting: Land Ownership Risk and Adverse Possession Statutes' (2001) 77 Land
Economics 360; J-Y Kim, 'Good-faith Error and Intentional Trespassing in Adverse Possession' (2004)
24 International Review of Law and Economics 1; B Depoorter, 'Adverse Possession' in B Bouckaert
(ed) Property Law and Economics (Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA 2010); JE Stake, 'The Uneasy
Case for Adverse Possession' (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419; TJ Miceli and CF Sirmans, 'An
Economic Theory of Adverse Possession' (1995) 15 International Review of Law and Economics 161;
TW Merrill, 'Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession' (1984) 79 Northwestern
University Law Review 1122; LA Fennell, 'Efficient Trespass: The Case for "Bad Faith" Adverse
Possession' (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037.
36
By the way, the DCFR Comment treats possessors who intend to be a LRP but do not have the right
to possess as, confusingly, an OP. the DCFR Full Edition 2009 4355. This possessor may very well
behave as if a LRP, not as if an OP. This problem would become more salient if the doctrine regarding
acquisition of ownership by continuous possession will be applied to real property.
37
See also the DCFR Full Edition 2009 4292 (LRPs and PAs cannot acquire ownership by
continuous possession). Note, however, that whether intention should be required for
prescriptive acquisition is debatable, but it is not the focus of this article.
38
For economic analysis of first possession, see A Bell, 'Title in the Shadow of Possession' in Y-c
Chang (ed) Law and Economics of Possession (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015); D
Lueck, 'The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law' (1995) 38 Journal of Law &
Economics 393. See also the seminal contribution by CM Rose, 'Possession as the Origin of Property'
(1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 73.
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“possession as a basis for acquiring ownership.” 39 Only ownership acquisition 40
and relinquishment requires possessors to have certain animus.

The concept of possession, defined as the least common denominator, can
easily be combined with other requirements (here, certain animus) in any
doctrine. The downside of defining possession with intention built-in is that it
needlessly interferes with the understanding of other doctrines. In good-faith
purchase doctrines (VIII-3:101) and revindication doctrines, whether the
possessors/purchasers and unlawful possessors intend to become owners is out
of the question. Put differently, if in the political CFR, acquisition of ownership by
continuous possession is not allowed, it would not be necessary to distinguish
between OP and LRP.

Second, one might also challenge that my definition will greatly affect the
protection of possession. Such an argument would go as follows: under my
framework, PA is a possessor; direct possessor who uses PA to exercise physical
control is highly unlikely (but depending on context) to be a possessor; and
indirect possessor is surely not a possessor. More importantly, only possessors
(PA and personal direct possessors) are entitled to recover possession, and
indirect possessors and direct possessors who use PAs are no longer entitled to
directly recover possession. 41

My responses are that there is nothing wrong with a person originally with
actual physical possession to recover possession from, say, a thief. PAs may not
have incentives to file such a lawsuit, but direct possessors can 1) file
revindication lawsuits if they are owners; 2) use the terms in the contract
between direct possessors and PAs to request the latter to file a possession
recovery lawsuits; or 3) subrogate PA in filing the lawsuit. 42 Similar arguments
apply to the context where there are an indirect possessor and a direct possessor
and the latter does nothing in spite of the infringed possession. Indirect
possessors, who under my framework cannot file for possession recovery, can
39

Chang (n 10) 113–117.
Possession serves important role in acquiring and maintaining ownership (or, title). See B Arruñada,
'The Titling Role of Possession' in Y-c Chang (ed) Law and Economics of Possession (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 2015).
41
Comment A to VIII-1:205 (the DCFR Full Edition 2009 4292) states that because Chapter 6 of VIII
does not protect PAs, so PAs are not possessors.
42
Subrogation is narrowly defined in the Annex of the DCFR as “in relation to rights, is the process by
which a person who has made a payment or other performance to another person acquires by operation
of law that person’s rights against a third person.” My usage of subrogation is broader here, including
legal actions such as creditors file lawsuits against their debtors’ debtors in order to restore the solvency
of the creditors’ debtors. Article 1166 of the French Civil Code and Articles 242 of the Taiwan Civil
Code, for example, allow such a subrogation.
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also 1) file for revindication if they are owners; 2) request direct possessors to
sue; or 3) subrogate direct possessors to sue.

Granted, revindication lawsuits may not always be easy. the DCFR Comment
notes that “[I]n some legal systems, the requirement for the proof of
ownership…are quite strict (probatio diabolica), in others they are not (e.g.
France).” 43 In an ideal world, France would be a role model, so that (in)direct
possessors who are owners can with reasonable evidence prove their ownership
and file for revindication. Yet even in European jurisdictions where proof of
evidence is a problem—and this is treated as given—establishing a broader
subrogation right in the DCFR, at least in the context of protecting possession and
ownership, should be warranted. Subrogation and a simple concept of possession
are two building blocks in the private law system, and their combination shall be
both effective in protecting possession and ownership and easily
understandable—a possession concept that both professionals and laymen can
understand in everyday life 44 enable laymen to obey the law and make the life of
legal professionals easier in enacting, applying, and understanding law.
D. Is Possession a Fact or a Right?

Comment E accompanying VIII-6:101 ponders whether possession is a right,
a proprietary right or a mere fact. 45 In my book chapter, 46 I contend that
possession is both a fact and a subsidiary right. 47 Possession is a fact when the
physical control aspect is under discussion. Possession as a subsidiary right,
called possessory rights in my edited book, 48 correspond (roughly) to the “right
to possess” that appears multiple times in the articles and Comments of the
DCFR. Yet this right to possess is not clearly defined and is therefore clarified
below.
The right to possess is one of the incidents in ownership. VIII. – 1:202
defines ownership as “the most comprehensive right a person, the ‘owner’, can
43

the DCFR Full Edition 2009 5167. See also Chang (n 10) 111.
See generally TW Merrill, 'Ownership and Possession' in Y-c Chang (ed) Law and Economics of
Possession (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015).
45
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 5164-5166.
46
Chang (n 10) 109–110.
47
Admittedly, although possession as a fact, meaning physical control, is directly related to the
discussion on the economy of concept, possession as a right (or not) is not an issue that warrants the
same analysis. Nevertheless, one cannot fully understand the concept of possession is these two
dimensions are not distinguished.
48
See for instance ibid; DB Kelly, 'Dividing Possessory Rights' in Y-c Chang (ed) Law and Economics
of Possession (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015).
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have over property, including the exclusive right, so far as consistent with
applicable laws or rights granted by the owner, to use, enjoy, modify, destroy,
dispose of and recover the property.” This can be considered as consistent with
my claim that ownership is a bundle of subsidiary rights. 49 That is, ownership
contains multiple subsidiary rights which could be conceptualized in different
fashions. Some may identify the right to possess as one of the incidents, whereas
it appears that the DCFR has chosen to subsume the right to possess under other
incidents, such as the subsidiary right to use. No matter how the bundle is
described, the numerus clausus principle limits the way an owner can divide and
re-package the subsidiary rights. Certain limited property rights contain the right
to possess, such as usufruct, while others do not, such as mortgage. 50 My
ownership theory further suggests that the right to possess can be divided into in
rem and in personam right to possess. The right to possess derived from a limited
property right is in rem. The right to possess derived from contract such as lease
is in personam.

Without explicitly spelling out the nature of the right to possess, the DCFR
contains several problematic articles and Comments. First, VIII-6:301(2)
(entitlement to recover in case of better possession) stipulates that “[t]he former
possession is “better” than the current possession if the former possessor is in
good faith and has a right to possess, while the other person has no right to
possess, the goods….” That is, to be eligible for possession recovery, the former
possessor has to be both “in good faith” and “[having] a right to possess.” Good
faith/bad faith should only matter when the possessor does not have a right to
possess. What does it mean to be bad faith about one’s having a right to possess?
Comment E to this article states that good faith is a reasonable belief that one has
a right to possess. 51 But since “having a right to possess” is already required, the
good faith requirement is not only redundant but also perplexing. As long as the
former possessor has in rem or in personam right to possess, while the current
possessor has neither, the former should be entitled to recover from the latter,
regardless of good faith or bad faith.
Second, the DCFR Comment contends that in a double sale, the later
purchaser who does not gain physical control only “has the right to possess” 52—
49

Chang (n 10) 109–10.
It should be noted that my view of ownership is more consistent with the subtraction method rather
than the limitation method of conceptualizing ownership. See Akkermans (n 18) for comparison of the
two. Akkermans also points out that the DCFR recognizes Anwartschaftsrecht as a limited proprietary
right, which is inconsistent with the subtraction method of defining ownership.
51
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 5280.
52
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 4357 (Illustration 8).
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here, the right to possess is in personam, as it is only exerted against the seller,
not the other purchaser who has gained title. The Comment should have been
clearer on this.

Third, the DCFR Comment considers it “unproblematic” to treat the right of a
lessee to possess (where lease is a contract) as a proprietary right. 53 I
respectfully disagree. A limited property right that contains a right to possess
would have in rem effect (that is, automatically against the whole world 54). A
lessee, however, does not have an in rem right to possess. A lease contract gives
the lessee an in personam right to possess against the lessor. Chapter 6 of Volume
VIII of the DCFR awards a mere possessor a wide right to recover possession. 55
Still, as made clear by Comment D to VIII-6: 203, 56 the former possessor (such as
a lessee of a car) cannot recover possession against a current possessor who did
not unlawfully dispossess. Therefore, unlike an owner or a holder of a limited
property right, who can recover possession against anyone currently exercising
physical control, a lessee’s right to possess is still not unlimited, not against the
whole world. As a result, it would be problematic to treat the right to possess as
in rem (or, for that matter, proprietary).
Finally, in the DCFR, one can even encounter right to possess where the
source of the right is unclear. 57 According to VIII-1:207(1)(a), a LRP has to
acquire her right to possess the goods from her contract with OP. Nevertheless,
an OP is not necessarily an owner; rather, an OP could be a person who tries to
acquire ownership through continuous possession (or, prescriptive acquisition).
How could such an OP, who possesses without any right, gives the LRP “the right
to possess” the goods, no matter an in rem one or an in personam one? For the
purpose of defining LRP, whether OP is the owner or not does not matter. What is
important for the definition of LRP is that a person holds the goods but regards
another person as the owner. For lack of attention to the notion of right to

53

the DCFR Full Edition 2009 5166.
Y-c Chang and HE Smith, 'An Economic Analysis of Civil versus Common Law Property' (2012) 88
Notre Dame Law Review 1, 33.
55
The recovery right under the DCFR is in many ways wider than that under domestic laws in EU
jurisdictions, as the (former) possessor needs not possess the thing in question for more than one year,
and the dispossession does not have to be violent under the DCFR. Chang (n 10) 110.
56
the DCFR Full Edition 2009 5238 (Illustration 2).
57
It is worth noting one place where I think the DCFR makes an ingenious design. I have argued that
unlawful possessors should not be able to recover their possession through the court. Chang (n 10)
112–113. the DCFR still allows unlawful possessors to bring such a claim to court, but the other party
can counter claim her better possession, the court should take that into account pursuant to VIII-6:204.
I shall emphasize that under my theory better possession has to mean that the other party has either in
rem or in personam right to possess to prevail. VIII-6:301(2) stipulates that when neither parties has a
right to possess, and both of them are in good faith, the current possession prevails. I agree. I would
extend this current-possession-prevail position to bad-faith parties not entitled to possess.
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possess, the DCFR inadvertently leaves a gap in LRP.
IV. CONCLUSION

To properly construct the concept of possession, one has to keep an eye on
the basic building blocks of property law, even the whole private law. While my
view of property law, such as property as a structured bundle of relations and
ownership as a bundle of subsidiary rights, may be unconventional, it is in no
way the precondition for my proposed simplified definition of possession.
Possession as simply physical control can be inserted in any civil code, and only
minor adjustments are needed to maintain the substantive contents of other
private law doctrines. When drafters of, say, a European Civil Code, start with
possession as physical control and stick with this simple concept throughout the
civil code, they shall find that private law will become easier to construct and
easier for laymen and professionals alike to comprehend.

While the drafters of the DCFR drifted away from the common core
approach, they started with it. One demerit of the common core approach is to
perpetuate path dependency. Germany, France, the Netherlands, and many other
countries contain overly complicated concept of possession. The common core
approach, either choosing a majority conceptual system or extracting the least
common denominator, is unlikely to run away from the traction of the
undesirable status quo of complication. Drafters who employ the best solution
approach have to step back and, preferably, start from scratch in order to design
the truly most efficient mechanism. This article provides one way of
conceptualizing possession, and Law and Economics of Possession has more to
offer.
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